Examining memory specificity and generalization contributions to false recall in DRM paradigm

Why are some people more susceptible to false memory than others? Prior evidence indicates that false memories arise from a lack of specificity in memory representations. Additionally, false memory has been postulated to reflect a constructive generalization process that may be adaptive in nature. Here, we tested how individual differences in false memory relate to the ability to recall differentiating details (specificity) and the ability to integrate across related experiences (generalization) in a large sample of participants. False memory was assessed using the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott paradigm (DRM), where participants study lists of related words (e.g., sour, honey, tooth) and then often falsely recall non-presented critical lure (sweet). Participants completed the DRM paradigm along with multiple measures of memory specificity and generalization. Multiple regression revealed that higher memory specificity scores predicted greater true recall and lower false recall in DRM, supporting theories that emphasize the role of memory specificity in preventing false memories. In contrast, higher memory generalization predicted higher true recall but accounted for no unique variance in false recall when considering specificity. These findings inform current theories of false memory and indicate that false memories may stem from reduced representational specificity rather than adaptive abstraction.