A Defense of Post-Viability Abortion

It is often thought that Thomson's Violinist argument is only applicable before the point of viability. In this paper, I propose that this is not the case, offering a novel defense of post-viability abortion utilising Thomson's self-defense framework. I first set out Thomson's Violinist argument and how it interacts with viability. Then I defend the Invasiveness Claim: there is a stringent right not to have to go through childbirth (including the "safe removal procedures" of induction of labor and caesarian section) because of the level and nature of invasiveness. This is because unwanted childbirth can be seen as a harm in some ways akin to rape. Finally, I show that the Invasiveness Claim along with Thomson's view on self-defense leads to the conclusion that post-viability abortion is morally permissible. My conclusion is conditional: using a Thomsonian framework of abortion, if a third party may kill an innocent perpetrator in a case of "other-defense", then it is morally permissible for a pregnant person to choose to have an abortion (and a third party to provide abortion) to avoid having to give birth, even after the point of viability. This constitutes a significant moral defense of almost all post-viability abortions for those sympathetic to Thomson's defense of abortion and her view of self-defense, and one which I think is underexplored. There is much literature on abortion as self-defense to avoid pregnancy, but not much about abortion as self-defense to avoid childbirth, or about women having a stringent right not to undergo labor.