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Related Concept Videos

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Social Exchange Theory

As formulated by John Thibaut and Harold Kelley, Social Exchange Theory explains human relationships as economic-like exchanges that maximize rewards and minimize costs. This theory suggests that individuals engage in relationships to gain benefits and reduce burdens, similar to economic transactions. It has been widely applied to various types of relationships, including romantic, professional, and social interactions.Rewards and Costs in RelationshipsRelationship rewards include emotional...
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Equity Theory01:26

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Social Proof00:52

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Related Experiment Video

Updated: Jun 17, 2026

The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm
06:18

The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm

Published on: October 20, 2022

Reputation-based nonlinear investment promotes cooperation in networked N-player trust games.

Xiaoyi Jiang1,2, Wensheng Jia1,2

  • 1College of Mathematics and Statistics, State Key Laboratory of Public Big Data, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China.

Chaos (Woodbury, N.Y.)
|June 16, 2026
PubMed
Summary

This study introduces a reputation-based system for trust games that rewards trustworthy behavior, enhancing cooperation and average payoffs in networked interactions. The mechanism effectively balances reputation and investment to sustain trust and cooperation.

Related Experiment Videos

Last Updated: Jun 17, 2026

The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm
06:18

The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm

Published on: October 20, 2022

Area of Science:

  • Evolutionary Game Theory
  • Network Science
  • Behavioral Economics

Background:

  • Trust is crucial for cooperation but fragile among self-interested individuals.
  • Existing trust game models lack effective mechanisms to incentivize trustee behavior.
  • Asymmetric payoff structures in trust games require nuanced investment rules.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To propose a novel reputation-based investment allocation mechanism for networked N-player trust games.
  • To investigate how reputation influences strategy evolution and cooperation dynamics.
  • To identify optimal parameters for balancing reputation and investment.

Main Methods:

  • Developed a reputation-based investment allocation mechanism with a nonlinear softmax rule.
  • Simulated N-player trust games on various network structures (lattice, small-world, scale-free).
  • Analyzed the feedback loop between reputation, payoff, and strategy evolution.

Main Results:

  • The mechanism effectively directs resources to high-reputation players, suppressing untrustworthy behavior.
  • Cooperation index and average payoffs significantly improved.
  • A balance between investment sensitivity and reputation preference is crucial for sustained wealth generation.

Conclusions:

  • Reputation-based nonlinear allocation is key to sustaining trust in networked trust games.
  • The proposed framework integrates reputation scoring, nonlinear allocation, and strategy updating.
  • Optimal parameters are necessary to suppress untrustworthy behavior while maintaining capital flow.