The adaptive function of analytic thinking styles: Balancing effort and accuracy in meta-reasoning

If many reasoning errors stem from hasty judgments and avoidable biases rather than inherent ability, can people be helped to overcome these failure-prone tendencies? Meta-reasoning theories suggest that motivational thinking styles-or analytic thinking dispositions-are central in overriding intuition and engaging reflectively. However, people may not value truth, knowledge, and accuracy enough to activate these dispositions, or may lack the metacognitive insight to recognize their relevance. Additionally, typical self-report measures of thinking styles struggle to distinguish between the willingness to engage in effortful thought and cognitive ability. This study investigated the causal connection between probing thinking styles with educative content and reasoning performance via the detection and decoupling of conflict. In a randomized controlled trial, participants (N = 364) completed online modules promoting virtuous epistemic habits, such as intellectual humility, curiosity, and tenacity. A within-person mixed-effects modeling approach showed that, although there was no overall or direct effect on reasoning, the treatment group spent more time deliberating on conflict-invoking reasoning tasks than the control condition, which in turn indirectly influenced reasoning performance. They also showed greater metacognitive sensitivity when judging their own accuracy. Importantly, treatment participants did not deliberate longer when reflection was unhelpful, suggesting a targeted application of cognitive effort. Follow-up analyses indicate that a reduced preference for intuitive thinking-as opposed to increased effortful thinking-may underlie these effects. These findings highlight two implications for meta-reasoning: first, cognitive styles causally influence intuition override; second, thinking styles serve an adaptive function, helping individuals discern when to reflect and when not to.