Camouflaging in autism as a dual-normative construct: a philosophical critique

Social camouflaging-broadly defined as the suppression or modulation of autistic traits to conform to dominant ableist social norms-has become a dominant construct in autism research. Yet despite its empirical and cultural prominence, the concept has not undergone sustained philosophical scrutiny. This paper develops a fourfold critique. Ontologically, camouflaging lacks stability, as it fails to identify a coherent class of phenomena distinguishable from adjacent behaviours. Epistemologically, it relies on theory-laden and circular methodologies that presuppose what they purport to measure. Logically, it embeds contradictions, particularly in attributing intentional capacities to subjects diagnosed in part on the basis of impaired social reasoning. Ethically, it operates within a dual-normative framework that pathologises deviation while privileging narrow forms of autistic legibility. We argue that deconstructing camouflaging exposes its fragility and raises fundamental questions about the normative commitments underlying psychiatric classification.