Free Riding in Healthcare Through a Game-Theoretic Lens: A Cross-Domain Narrative Review and Conceptual Synthesis

Background/Objectives: Free riding in healthcare occurs when actors benefit from health-related public goods, risk-pooling arrangements, common resources, or cooperative institutions while contributing less than is socially optimal. This review clarifies how free-rider dynamics differ across vaccination, health insurance and universal health coverage, antimicrobial resistance, organ donation and transplant allocation, and global health cooperation. Methods: A narrative review with conceptual synthesis was conducted. Searches of PubMed and Scopus were complemented by citation tracking and targeted inclusion of foundational economics, game theory, public-health ethics, and market-design sources. Sources were mapped by domain, actors, strategies, payoff structure, information conditions, time horizon, enforcement mechanism and policy relevance. Results: Across domains, free riding arises when private payoffs diverge from collective welfare, but the underlying game differs: threshold public-good and coordination games in vaccination, adverse-selection and participation games in insurance, common-pool-resource dilemmas in antimicrobial use, donor-registration and matching-market problems in transplantation, and repeated public-goods games in global health. The review identifies three policy functions: altering payoffs, altering information and beliefs, and changing the structure, repetition, or enforceability of the game. Conclusions: Game theory is most useful as a mechanism-based framework rather than a stand-alone policy prescription. Its policy value depends on empirical calibration, institutional context, ethical legitimacy, and attention to equity, incomplete information, behavioral responses, and enforcement capacity. The synthesis also emphasizes boundary conditions: game-theoretic prescriptions can fail when political economy, asymmetric power, implementation capacity, access barriers, or trust-related drivers are ignored.