Poisoning the Genome: Targeted Backdoor Attacks on DNA Foundation Models.

Area of Science:

• Genomics
• Artificial Intelligence
• Bioinformatics

Background:

• Foundation models trained on DNA sequences excel at biological tasks like variant effect prediction.
• These models utilize massive genomic datasets, but DNA's lack of semantic transparency hinders detection of corrupted data.
• Genomic data curation faces challenges in identifying adversarial entries.

Purpose of the Study:

• To systematically investigate data poisoning vulnerabilities in genomic language models.
• To assess the impact of poisoning during both pre-training and fine-tuning stages.
• To evaluate the susceptibility of models to targeted attacks on specific genomic features and tasks.

Main Methods:

• Investigated data poisoning in Evo 2 and GENERator architectures during pre-training.
• Simulated attacks by corrupting TATA-box motifs, CTCF binding sites, and inserting synthetic sequences.
• Explored fine-tuning attacks including backdoor installation via CTCF site poisoning and label corruption for variant classification.

Main Results:

• Less than 1% poisoned data at pre-training selectively degraded generative performance on targeted genomic contexts.
• Fine-tuning attacks successfully installed conditional backdoors and compromised variant classification tasks (e.g., BRCA1).
• Genomic foundation models demonstrated susceptibility to targeted data poisoning with minimal footprint.

Conclusions:

• Genomic foundation models are vulnerable to sophisticated data poisoning attacks.
• The findings underscore the critical need for enhanced data security and validation in AI for genomics.
• Recommended adopting data provenance tracking, integrity verification, and adversarial robustness evaluation.