Prohibition isn't protection: Biosecurity without verification

The eradication of smallpox remains one of the most significant achievements in public health, symbolizing the power of international cooperation, scientific coordination, and collective responsibility. However, the continued retention of eradicated pathogens, particularly live variola virus, reflects a broader and unresolved challenge within global biosecurity governance. While debates surrounding smallpox have often been framed narrowly in terms of risk-benefit considerations specific to a single pathogen, they increasingly expose deeper structural limitations in the systems designed to prevent biological harm. International frameworks such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) formally prohibit the development and stockpiling of biological agents for hostile purposes. Yet their effectiveness is constrained by incomplete universal participation, the absence of verification mechanisms, and limited capacity for enforcement. As a result, global biosecurity operates largely through normative commitments rather than enforceable accountability. In a world characterized by armed conflict, weakening multilateralism, and rapid advances in biotechnology, this reliance on trust-based governance is increasingly fragile. This editorial argues that the central issue is not simply whether eradicated pathogens such as variola virus, should be retained, but whether existing governance systems can manage biological risk in a credible and sustainable manner. If international norms cannot be effectively enforced, the assumption that prohibition equates to protection becomes increasingly untenable. Public health discourse must therefore move beyond pathogen-specific debates and engage more critically with the structural constraints of global biosecurity governance.