Big-tent versus small-tent views of the brain mechanisms underlying consciousness

We examine a seldom-discussed characteristic of scientific theories of human consciousness: the extent to which an adequate theory requires a big-tent or integrated, global neural substrate for consciousness or a more limited, small-tent or localized neural substrate. Most current theories of consciousness are big-tent, with the assumption that consciousness must integrate many different types of information, including the representation of sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and emotions, requiring areas in which these qualities are created to be part of the conscious network. We suggest, however, that small-tent theories remain tenable. In small-tent accounts, multiple brain processes selectively funnel information into the conscious area but no single, particular input would be necessary for consciousness. Activity that is not funneled to the critical brain region would not enter consciousness. A recent small-tent theory, the embedded-processes theory (Cowan et al., 2025), proposed a conscious ensemble including the left and right intraparietal sulcus and their connection as central to a capacity-limited, human focus of attention synonymous with consciousness. It would be embedded within a larger field of current memory activation, any part of which can be unconscious at any moment. Information from diverse brain regions, comprising selected elements from currently active memory, would be funneled into the focus of attention, becoming part of the conscious representation. Frontal control of attention need not be fully conscious. We explore issues related to the big- versus small-tent conceptions and discuss what evidence still is needed to determine the correct characterization of the brain representation of consciousness, falling along a big-tent to small-tent continuum.