Disagreement judgments capture more than differences in beliefs

Decades of research have examined the consequences of disagreement, both negative (harm to relationships) and positive (fostering learning opportunities). Yet the psychological mechanisms underlying disagreement judgments themselves are poorly understood. Much research assumes that disagreement tracks divergence: the difference between two individuals' beliefs with respect to a proposition, where this can be understood in binary terms (individuals either agree or disagree) or as a continuous difference (for instance, in subjective probability). We test divergence as an account of interpersonal disagreement judgments using predictive modeling (N = 238). Our results indicate that while judgments of disagreement track divergence, other properties of beliefs-such as their extremity-play a significant role. Moreover, these additional factors are necessary for predicting key social consequences of disagreement, including inferences of bias, coldness, and incompetence. These results suggest that the assumption that disagreement judgments merely track differences in belief is empirically unjustified.