A Systems-Based Approach for Analyzing Interorganizational Coordination Within Port Risk Control Structures

Area of Science:

• Systems Engineering
• Risk Management
• Sociotechnical Systems

Background:

• Traditional risk analysis often overlooks interorganizational dynamics.
• Complex sociotechnical systems require novel approaches to coordination analysis.
• Existing methods lack a systemic view of distributed governance and feedback structures.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a systems-based analysis approach for interorganizational coordination.
• To operationalize coordination as a systemic control problem using the Interorganizational Risk Management Coordination Taxonomy (IRM-CT).
• To evaluate coordination effectiveness based on accountability, predictability, and common understanding.

Main Methods:

• Developed the Interorganizational Risk Management Coordination Taxonomy (IRM-CT).
• Integrated coordination theory, sociotechnical systems thinking, and resilience engineering.
• Applied the IRM-CT to a proof-of-concept analysis using the Halifax Port Authority Port Information Guide.

Main Results:

• The IRM-CT distinguishes between operational and enabling adaptors.
• Identified three coordination states: Supported, Fragile, and Orphan.
• Demonstrated how authority, codification, and trust influence safe control.

Conclusions:

• The IRM-CT provides a structured method for diagnosing and strengthening interorganizational coordination.
• The approach enhances systemic risk governance in complex sociotechnical systems.
• Applicable to high-risk sectors beyond ports, including mining, aviation, and energy.