Nuancing psychological research with complexity: The case of embodied cognition and ecological dynamics

Psychological science is often hampered by the fact that mind and behavior are exceedingly complex subjects. There are many moving parts, and many interactions between these, which elicits a categorical shift in the nature of its variables. This demands a strong theoretic and meta-theoretic foundation to order and interpret results. Yet, especially the meta-theoretic foundation has been unduly neglected. To remediate this, the current paper invites to scrutinize the assumptions about the nature of the world implicit in theories, called metaphysics. We position complexity science as delivering effective methods by which to do this. Our analysis exposes meta-theoretic assumptions by asking whether a theory assumes that psychological phenomena 1) are the product of a complex system, 2) behave as a complex system, and 3) should be investigated as a complex system. We predict that this analysis will expose that theories often differ in their metaphysical assumptions of complexity, as opposed to their explicit theoretic postulates. It therefore nuances psychological theories by exposing the underlying causes of differences in theories, furthering the productivity of discussions. We first present this analysis and consequently turn it towards a case study, comparing two frameworks prominent in this special issue which share but also differ in meta-theoretic and theoretic postulates. This ambivalent proximity allows to demonstrate the strengths of the complexity perspective as an incisive tool for investigating competing positions.