Mechanistic Mayhem: Minding our musings on mechanisms

Mechanistic theories of explanation are widely held in the philosophy of science, especially in philosophy of biology, neuroscience and cognitive science. While such theories remain dominant in the field, there have been an increasing number of challenges raised against them over the past decade. These challenges claim that mechanistic explanations can lead to incoherence, triviality, or deviate too far from how scientists in the life sciences genuinely employ the term "mechanism". In this paper, I argue that these disputes are fueled, in part, by the running together of distinct questions and concerns regarding mechanisms, representations of mechanisms, and mechanistic explanation. More care and attention to how these are distinct from one another, but also the various ways they might relate, can help to push these disputes in more positive directions. I then highlight the sort of philosophical problems and concerns that we are better served focusing our attention on instead.