Correcting course for richer research programs: What nonstandard genetic codes mean for the frozen accident theory

What attitude should scientists have towards theories and theorizing? This paper criticizes one pervasive stance scientists take with regards to this question by assessing the significance of nonstandard genetic codes for Francis Crick's famous frozen accident theory (1968). When scientists engage with Crick's theory, they adopt the attitude that scientific theories are things to be confirmed or falsified. I argue this is the wrong attitude to adopt when assessing Crick's theory. I show how the logical complexity of Crick's theory has been widely misinterpreted. Not only has Crick's universality assumption been misunderstood, but the logical structure of frozen thesis lends itself to a plurality of (possibly incommensurable) operational specifications (Bich and Green 2018; Colaço 2022). A proper understanding of Crick's theory together with his own views on the purpose of theorizing suggests that something like provisional active scientific realism is the more appropriate attitude to take when assessing the frozen accident. Provisional active scientific realism is a logically weaker stance than Chang's (2014; 2022) view. On provisional active scientific realism, scientists should use Crick's theory as a vehicle for maximizing what they can learn about the world - at least at this early stage of investigation.