Pattern Formation in a Spatial Public Goods Dilemma due to Diffusive or Directed Motion

The costly provision of public goods serves as a model problem for the evolution of cooperative behavior, presenting a social dilemma between the collective benefits of shared resources and the individual incentive to free-ride in resource production. The spatial structure of populations can also impact cooperation over public goods, as diffusion of public goods and intentional motion of individuals towards regions with greater resources can interact with population and public goods dynamics to produce heterogeneous patterns in the spatial distribution of strategies and resources. In this paper, we build off a model introduced by Young and Belmonte for the reaction dynamics of interacting individuals and an explicit public good, deriving a system of PDEs that describes the spatial profiles of strategies and the public good in the presence of both diffusive motion of individuals and resources and chemotaxis-like directed motion of individuals in response to gradients in the concentration of public goods. Through linear stability analysis, we show that spatial patterns in strategic and public goods profiles can emerge due to either Turing instability with high defector diffusivity or a directed-motion instability through strong sensitivity of cooperators towards increasing resource concentration. We further explore the emergent spatial patterns with a mix of weakly nonlinear stability analysis and numerical simulation, showing that, for a wide range of reaction parameters, diffusion-driven instability appears to increase cooperation and public goods across the spatial domain, while directed motion of cooperators towards public goods tends to decrease cooperation and environmental quality across the environment.