Public information sharing during public health emergencies: an adaptive-network evolutionary game

Public health emergencies can generate verified sharing, opportunistic dissemination, and strategic silence within the same communication environment, yet diffusion-centered approaches offer limited explanation of how these contrasting behaviors emerge together or change as communication relationships evolve.

This study develops an adaptive-network evolutionary game in which individuals choose among verified/corrective sharing, opportunistic sharing, and silence. The model links information value, verification burden, attention incentives, targeted sanctions, and participation-related liability to local interaction and adaptive rewiring.

Valuable and low-burden credible information favors verified sharing, whereas strong attention incentives favor opportunistic dissemination. Targeted accountability can redirect behavior toward credible participation, while generalized liability weakens good-faith sharing and, when combined with broader withdrawal incentives, can contribute to information vacuums.

By separating information quality, information absence, and structural connectivity, the study shifts attention from diffusion volume to the joint evolution of behavior and communication relationships. The findings provide a mechanism-based basis for designing public-health communication policies that constrain harmful dissemination without discouraging credible participation.