Between Cradles and Compassion: A Conditional Obligation to Adopt Instead of Procreating

Such prominent authors as Tina Rulli have argued in favour of pro tanto duties to adopt instead of procreating. This article interrogates-and then subsequently extends support for-such a view. Specifically, this paper develops and defends a conditional moral obligation to adopt rather than procreate for agents who intend to become parents by drawing on antinatalist philosophy. It argues that even non-antinatalists should recognize what I call "antinatalistic pressures": reasons arising from the harms and risks of existence that shift the justificatory burden onto would-be procreators. I formulate a Conditional Obligation to Adopt and support it with two interlocking arguments: a modal argument, which highlights morally salient differences between aiding presently existing orphans and creating possible future children, and a moral epistemic argument, which emphasizes our comparatively firmer evidence about the harms and benefits affecting existing children. Together, these arguments suggest that preventing and alleviating actual-orphan-related harms has stronger moral claim than conferring merely possible benefits on not-yet-existent children. I then address prominent attempts to limit or waive duties to adopt, particularly those of Travis Rieder and Tina Rulli, arguing that appeals to the radical intimacy of family-making do less to block obligation than is often assumed. The upshot is that the pro tanto duty to adopt is both more robust and more demanding than its current defenders acknowledge.