Dispositions in Health and Disease

This paper calls on philosophers of medicine to attend to work on dispositions by metaphysicians. I make that call by drawing on recent work on dispositions to show several things. First, I show that the concept has been undertheorized by a wide range of theories of health and disease. Specifically, I discuss Boorse's influential biostatistical theory of health, Werkhoven's recent dispositional theory, and Aas and Wasserman's neglected revision to Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis. I also show how applying a careful analysis of dispositions clarifies and strengthens each theory. But I show, lastly, that objections to each of these views are more easily grasped by virtue of this analysis. This discussion clarifies and contributes to ongoing debates over how to analyze health and disease. And it reveals the need for these debates to be better informed by clear thinking about the nature of dispositions.