Inner speech and the architecture of social cognition: A commentary on Silvanto (2026)

This commentary builds on Silvanto's (2026) argument that congenital aphantasia should be recognised as a form of cognitive diversity rather than a pathology, with rehabilitation targeting underlying causes of imagery loss rather than the restoration of mental imagery. Silvanto further highlights the association between visual imagery loss and emotional dysregulation. While we support this move away from pathologising aphantasia, we highlight a critical gap in the literature: the underappreciated role of inner speech in social-emotional cognition. We argue that sensory imagery (and aphantasia) should be recognized as a multifaceted process, with dissociations observed across modalities. Furthermore, we propose that inner speech, whether condensed or expanded (accompanied by auditory verbal imagery), serves as a computationally efficient, resource-light alternative to sensory imagery, supporting cognition without the need for detailed sensorimotor simulation. This perspective reframes aphantasia as cognitive diversity and highlights the need for greater empirical and theoretical focus on inner speech.