Psychedelic ego-dissolution: a philosophical and qualitative critique

Ego-dissolution is a phenomenon of central interest across interdisciplinary research on psychedelics. In this paper, we present a philosophical and qualitative critique of the claim that ego-dissolution can result in conscious states with no phenomenal sense of self, i.e., states that completely lack any form of self-consciousness. We first turn to recent publications by Chris Letheby and Raphaël Millière, for whom trip reports of experiences induced by 5-MeO-DMT (5-methoxy-N,N-dimethyltryptamine) present clear evidence for the existence of totally selfless experiential states. Their claim is undermined, we argue, by the fact that they operate with overinflated notions of 'self' and 'self-consciousness,' meaning that more minimal forms are available and arguably still present in 5-MeO-DMT experiences. We then perform a qualitative thematic analysis of 411 5-MeO-DMT trip reports. Pointing to the ambiguous language of the trip reports, the self-admitted inadequacy of the descriptions and the affective dimension of the reported experiences, we argue that claims concerning total selflessness are unwarranted and instead offer an alternative interpretation: extreme ego-dissolution during 5-MeO-DMT experiences involves a radically minimal form of self-consciousness, one in which the identity of the subject is experienced as unfamiliar and underdetermined. This article is part of the discussion meeting issue 'From being to identity: analysis and synthesis of the self'.