Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: when people behave against their better judgment

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Psychology
• Behavioral Economics
• Decision Science

Background:

• Human decision-making often deviates from rational probability calculations.
• Cognitive-experiential self-theory posits two systems of thought: experiential and rational.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate how individuals make choices under uncertainty when presented with varying probabilities and absolute numbers of desired outcomes.
• To test predictions derived from cognitive-experiential self-theory regarding non-optimal choices.

Main Methods:

• Participants chose between two jelly bean bowls with different proportions and absolute numbers of red jelly beans (representing wins or losses).
• Choices were analyzed in relation to objective probabilities and subjective feelings of chance.
• Laboratory choices were correlated with heuristic responses to vignettes and self-reported gambling behavior.

Main Results:

• Subjects frequently preferred bowls with a higher absolute number of red jelly beans, despite lower probabilities of winning.
• This preference occurred even when the odds were mathematically unfavorable, driven by a feeling of having a 'better chance'.
• Similar, though less pronounced, effects were observed in loss-framed trials.

Conclusions:

• The findings support cognitive-experiential self-theory's principles, highlighting the influence of 'concretive' and 'experiential' processing on decision-making.
• Non-optimal choices in probability-based tasks are linked to heuristic reasoning and real-life gambling tendencies.