[Singer--and no end in sight? Or: can severely handicapped patients be "persons"?]

Children with profound disablement (hence, in conclusion, all individuals with profound mental retardation) are denied to possess personhood by the bioethicist Peter Singer, on the ground that they lack the capability of reason, of consciousness of self, and of self-determination. The article seeks to point out that Singer's concept of the person is too narrow: the very disposition for development of these abilities in itself is a constituent of personhood. Human social and spiritual interwovenness is considered another essential constituent. Finally, the fundamental difference between "life worth" and "quality of life" is pointed out, a differentiation which goes unnoticed with Singer. From the premises outlined, and in contrast to Singer's ethics of (one's own) personal happiness, emerges an ethics of solidarity, and of love, bearing also on the issues of euthanasia, abortion, and prenatal diagnostics.