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Related Experiment Videos

Genetic testing, life insurance, and adverse selection

P S Harper1

  • 1Institute of Medical Genetics, University of Wales College of Medicine, Cardiff, UK.

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences
|August 29, 1997
PubMed
Summary

Life insurers should reconsider using genetic test information for life insurance policies. The risk of adverse selection from Mendelian genetic disorders is minimal, suggesting potential benefits from policy changes.

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Area of Science:

  • Genetics
  • Insurance Law
  • Social Policy

Background:

  • Life insurance is integral to UK social structure, supporting family protection and home ownership.
  • Insurers currently access existing genetic test information, citing adverse selection avoidance.
  • The potential for adverse selection has not been rigorously quantified.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To evaluate the scope for adverse selection in life insurance due to Mendelian genetic disorders.
  • To assess the impact of insurers' use of genetic test information on policy underwriting.
  • To inform policy regarding genetic testing and life insurance in the UK.

Main Methods:

  • Review of major categories of Mendelian genetic disorders.
  • Analysis of the potential for adverse selection based on genetic information.

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  • Examination of current insurer practices regarding genetic test disclosure.

    • Main Results:

    • The scope for adverse selection from Mendelian genetic disorders in life insurance is very limited.
    • Insurers may gain more than they lose by not requiring disclosure of this genetic information.
    • Current insurer practices do not adequately estimate adverse selection risks.

    Conclusions:

    • Insurers should reconsider the necessity of using genetic test information for life insurance.
    • Foregoing the use of Mendelian genetic disorder information could benefit insurers and policyholders.
    • The issue requires urgent resolution given the future use of genetic screening tests.