量子鍵配送レーザー光源に対する光ポンピング攻撃

We report a new type of vulnerability based on a physical principle that has not been previously exploited in quantum hacking-optical pumping of a laser in practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. We show that it is possible to increase the pulse energy of a source laser diode not only by injection-locking it with external light near its emission wavelength of 1550 nm, but also by optically pumping it at a much shorter wavelength. We experimentally demonstrate a 10% increase in pulse energy when exposing the laser diode to continuous-wave (cw) laser light at 1310 nm with a power of 1.6 mW via its fiber pigtail. This effect may allow an eavesdropper to steal the secret key. A possible countermeasure is to install broadband optical filters and isolators at the source output and to characterize them during security certification.