サイドチャネル攻撃耐性を持つ量子鍵配送（QKD）における状態依存相関エラーとトロイの木馬攻撃

Quantum key distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to provide theoretically unconditional security for cryptographic key sharing. However, practical implementations remain vulnerable due to potential security loopholes at both the source and detection sides of QKD systems. The side-channel-secure (SCS) protocol addresses these challenges by encoding bits in vacuum and non-vacuum states and introducing a third-party measurement node, thereby repelling attacks targeting the detection side as well as external lab attacks on the source side. In this work, we consider the state-dependent correlated errors and Trojan-horse attack while preserving the SCS protocol's key advantage--specifically, requiring only upper bounds on intensity characterization without needing a full description of quantum states in infinite dimensions. Numerical results demonstrate that when the reflected light intensity from Trojan-horse attacks falls below 10^-6, Eve can scarcely extract additional key information from the reflections. This work makes the SCS protocol more practical.