プラグマティックな多元主義と問題設定：なぜプラグマティズムは多元主義を要求するのか

In this paper I focus on the benefits of scientific pluralism in practice. My main motivation is to investigate how do these benefits play out in practice, and how do different systems of knowledge come together to address particular questions? One might accept the epistemic benefits of plurality, yet still deem it undesirable for pragmatic reasons. My argument responds to this objection, which assumes that pragmatic demands can supersede the epistemic benefits of pluralism based on the problems at hand. I argue that this objection fails because it assumes problems are independent of inquirers. Building on classical pragmatism, I argue that problems are framed by inquirers and cannot be seen as separate from practices. Rather than facing predefined problems, inquirers confront indeterminate situations, requiring judgements on how to formulate the situation. Different framings are possible based on who is involved in making these judgments. A lack of plurality among inquirers leads to frameworks that overlook certain aspects and complexity. Therefore, pluralism is pragmatically beneficial when framing a problem, enabling inquirers to explore various dimensions of complex situations and enrich problem framing. I illustrate my argument by analysing the early responses to the UK COVID-19 outbreak, showing how the problem was initially framed as biomedical, neglecting social, logistical, and psychological aspects. The lack of plurality in the inquirer community led to shortcomings in the official response. Building on this case, I show that pragmatism demands pluralism when dealing with complex situations, demonstrating that plurality must be promoted in practice, going beyond recognized epistemic benefits.