Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Psychology

Background:

• Recent philosophical theories of self can advance interdisciplinary dialogue.
• The self is conceptualized through two key frameworks: the minimal self and the narrative self.

Purpose of the Study:

• To review and integrate philosophical concepts of the self with empirical findings in cognitive science.
• To explore the minimal self and narrative self, examining their neurological underpinnings and implications.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of self-agency versus self-ownership.
• Review of neurological studies, including schizophrenia and neonatal experience.
• Integration of cognitive models, such as Gazzaniga's interpreter theory and episodic memory.

Main Results:

• The minimal self can be distinguished by self-agency and self-ownership, with disruptions observed in neurological conditions like schizophrenia.
• Primitive aspects of self connect to neonatal experience and robotics.
• The narrative self aligns with the left-hemisphere interpreter and episodic memory, with potential for neurological integration.

Conclusions:

• Philosophical insights into the self can inform cognitive science research.
• A collaborative, two-way approach between philosophy and cognitive science is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the self.