Self, intentionality, and immunological explanation

In this paper I propose that there are a number of conceptual reasons to preserve self-concepts in immunology. First, I contend that immunological language, including self-terminology, is neither genuinely anthropomorphic, nor perniciously teleological. Furthermore, although teleology associated with future-directed purposive intent is clearly inappropriate in biological contexts, a special type of teleology, intentionality-as-aboutness, needs to be present if there is to be functional explanation in immunology. Second, based on an analogy with the human self, a self comprised of both non-specific innate functions and somatic self-representation, I claim that self-terminology is very appropriate in immunological contexts. Finally, given the appropriateness of self-concepts in immunology, I suggest that the most satisfactory conceptual structure for self-nonself discrimination probably includes both innate and somatic mechanisms.