Dispelling the "mystery" of computational cognitive science

H. Crowther-Heyck (1999) argued that early advocates of computational cognitive science, especially George Miller, aimed to bring about a revival of traditional mentalism, including the issues of consciousness and free will. He therefore found it inexplicable, and even "ironic," that they selected the computer as their main research tool because computers seem no more conscious and no more free than, for instance, the telephone switchboard that was one of the behaviorists' key metaphors. I argue, by contrast, that this misunderstands the main thrust of cognitive science, which was not to bring back all of traditional mentalism, but was rather only to give a rigorous account of intentionality. Once this is recognized, Crowther-Heyck's "mystery" of cognitive science is dispelled because, as is well known, computers use symbolic representations, and thus were seen by the early cognitive scientists as being prime mechanical models of intentional processes.