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Is ethics consultation dangerous?

Donnie J Self

    Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics : CQ : the International Journal of Healthcare Ethics Committees
    |October 1, 1993
    PubMed
    Summary
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    Scofield argues against moral expertise, suggesting value judgments cannot be right or wrong. This philosophical stance risks undermining normative ethics by promoting extreme relativism in ethical decision-making.

    Area of Science:

    • Philosophy of Ethics
    • Moral Relativism
    • Normative Ethics

    Background:

    • Critique of Scofield's article on ethical decision-making.
    • Scofield's position advocates for value subjectivism and radical relativism.
    • Challenges the concept of moral expertise in ethical judgments.

    Purpose of the Study:

    • To analyze and critique Scofield's philosophical stance on ethics.
    • To examine the implications of Scofield's views on normative ethics.
    • To assert the existence of better and worse value judgments.

    Main Methods:

    • Philosophical argumentation and critical analysis of Scofield's claims.
    • Examination of the logical consequences of value subjectivism.
    • Contrast between Scofield's position and common-sense ethical understanding.
    Keywords:
    Bioethics and Professional Ethics

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    Main Results:

    • Scofield's argument, though well-articulated, is deemed philosophically unsound.
    • His position leads to a radical relativism where all value judgments are equally valid.
    • This view negates the possibility of objective correctness or incorrectness in ethical decisions.

    Conclusions:

    • Scofield's denial of moral expertise fundamentally undermines normative ethics.
    • The article highlights the philosophical dangers of extreme value relativism.
    • Common sense and ethical practice support the idea that some value judgments are superior to others.