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Costly signaling and cooperation.
H Gintis1, E A Smith, S Bowles
1Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA. hgintis@mediaone.net
Journal of Theoretical Biology
|November 16, 2001
Summary
Cooperation evolves in social groups as an honest signal of an individual's quality. This signaling attracts advantageous alliances, even in non-repeated interactions, promoting group benefits.
Area of Science:
- Evolutionary Biology
- Behavioral Ecology
- Game Theory
Background:
- Cooperation among unrelated individuals is a puzzle in evolutionary biology.
- Non-cooperation is often the dominant strategy in anonymous interactions.
- Understanding the evolution of cooperation requires explaining its adaptive benefits.
Purpose of the Study:
- To propose and model an explanation for the evolution of cooperation based on honest signaling.
- To demonstrate how cooperation can be an evolutionarily stable strategy.
- To identify conditions under which cooperative behaviors can proliferate.
Main Methods:
- Framing cooperation as a multi-player public goods game.
- Analyzing the game without repeated or assortative interactions.
- Investigating the evolutionary stability of signaling through public goods provision.
Main Results:
- Cooperation can evolve as an honest signal of an individual's quality.
- This signaling confers advantages in forming beneficial alliances.
- Cooperative signaling can be evolutionarily stable and increase in frequency.
Conclusions:
- Cooperation can be explained as a mechanism for honest quality signaling.
- This signaling leads to advantageous social partnerships.
- The model applies to diverse cooperative behaviors, including resource sharing and norm enforcement.