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I, zombie.

Paul Skokowski1

  • 1Symbolic Systems Program, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-2150, USA.

Consciousness and Cognition
|March 9, 2002
PubMed
Summary

Philosophical theories suggest zombies are possible by arguing qualia are nonphysical. This study refutes this, asserting qualia are physical properties, supporting materialism and rejecting zombie possibilities.

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Area of Science:

  • Philosophy of Mind
  • Metaphysics
  • Neuroscience

Background:

  • Recent philosophical theories propose the possibility of zombies.
  • These theories posit that experiential contents (qualia) are nonphysical properties.
  • Arguments for zombie possibility rely on conceivability of alternate worlds with differing or absent qualia.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To argue that qualia are physical properties.
  • To challenge the conceivability arguments for zombies.
  • To provide a reasoned choice favoring materialism.

Main Methods:

  • Analysis of philosophical arguments for zombie possibility.
  • Examination of the relationship between qualia and physical properties.
  • Application of a posteriori identification to link qualia with physical properties.

Main Results:

  • Qualia are identified as physical properties.
  • Conceivability arguments for zombies are shown to be flawed.
  • Materialism is favored over dualistic or nonphysical theories of qualia.

Conclusions:

  • The possibility of zombies is rejected.
  • Qualia are physical properties, aligning with a materialist worldview.
  • This perspective offers a coherent framework for understanding consciousness.

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