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Updated: Oct 1, 2026

The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm
Published on: October 20, 2022
New information and social trust: asymmetry and perseverance of attributions about hazard managers
George Cvetkovich1, Michael Siegrist, Rachel Murray
1Department of Psychology, Western Washington University, Bellingham, WA 98225-9089, USA.
Abstract:
It has been argued that news about negative events has a much stronger effect on decreasing social trust than does news about positive events on increasing it. This asymmetry principle of trust was investigated in two surveys that also investigated the perseverance of trust. The possibility that established trust attributions persevere in the face of new information raises questions about the limits of trust asymmetry. The two studies yielded evidence that both type of news (good versus bad) and initial general trust in the nuclear power industry or the food supply industry affected level of trust. Compared to individuals trusting the industry, those distrusting the industry exhibited less trust following both bad and good news events. Study I also found that judged informativeness and judged positiveness of news events were affected by type of news and general trust of the industry. Individuals low in general trust of the nuclear power industry judged both bad news and good news as less positive than did those high in general trust. Those low in general trust judged bad news as more informative than good news and than did those high in general trust. An important implication of the perseverance of trust is to focus attention on including not only the effects of information about specific events and actions, but also on the judgment processes underlying social trust. The Salient Value Similarity model is suggested as one way of accounting for these psychological processes.
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