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The evolution of altruistic punishment
Robert Boyd1, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles
1Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA. boyd@anthro.sscnet.ucla.edu
Summary
Altruistic punishment, where individuals incur costs to punish noncooperators, can evolve even in large groups. This finding resolves an evolutionary puzzle and explains high cooperation levels in human societies.
Area of Science:
- Evolutionary biology
- Behavioral economics
- Social psychology
Background:
- Altruistic punishment, costly punishment of noncooperators, is observed even in one-shot interactions.
- Existing evolutionary models predict altruistic punishment is only stable in small groups, posing an evolutionary puzzle for large-scale human cooperation.
Purpose of the Study:
- To investigate the evolutionary stability of altruistic punishment in large, anonymous groups.
- To resolve the puzzle of how altruistic punishment can explain cooperation in large human societies.
Main Methods:
- Theoretical modeling of evolutionary game theory.
- Analysis of asymmetries between altruistic cooperation and altruistic punishment.
Main Results:
- An asymmetry between altruistic cooperation and altruistic punishment allows punishment to evolve in large populations.
- Altruistic punishment can be maintained even with large group sizes and parameters resembling early human societies.
Conclusions:
- Altruistic punishment can evolve and be maintained in large, anonymous groups, resolving a key evolutionary puzzle.
- This mechanism helps explain the high levels of cooperation observed in human societies, even in large groups.