Personhood, patienthood, and clinical practice: reassessing advance directives

This article considers 2 major critiques of advance directives and offers a defense to each of them. The 1st critique is philosophical in nature and maintains that the moral authority of an advance directive is undercut by a failure of personal identity to survive the loss of decisional capacity. The response in this article is that this critique relies on a flawed and disfavored concept of persons and their persistence over time. The 2nd critique, pragmatic in nature, argues that advance directives cannot be authoritative because the requisite elements of an informed consent to or refusal of treatment are rarely present, and many such instruments are ambiguous. The author argues that if the creation of advance directives, as a form of advance care planning, is made an integral aspect of clinical practice, many more patients will elect to execute directives, and those directives will not be ambiguous.