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Ronald Dworkin on abortion and assisted suicide
1Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York, NY 1003, USA. fmk1@nyu.edu
Summary
This article questions Ronald Dworkin's views on the intrinsic value of life and abortion. It also examines assisted suicide, arguing for the moral relevance of distinctions between killing/letting die and intention/foresight in specific contexts.
Area of Science:
- Bioethics
- Moral Philosophy
Background:
- Ronald Dworkin's theories on the intrinsic value of life and its implications for abortion are examined.
- Dworkin's arguments regarding the moral distinctions in assisted suicide, specifically killing vs. letting die and intending vs. foreseeing death, are analyzed.
Purpose of the Study:
- To critically evaluate Dworkin's philosophical positions on the value of life, abortion, and assisted suicide.
- To explore the moral relevance of distinctions in end-of-life decision-making.
- To propose an alternative argument for physician-assisted suicide.
Main Methods:
- Philosophical analysis and critique of Dworkin's theories.
- Examination of moral distinctions in bioethical contexts.
- Development of a novel argument for physician-assisted suicide.
Main Results:
- Questions are raised regarding Dworkin's theory of intrinsic life value and its application to abortion.
- The moral relevance of the killing/letting die distinction in assisted suicide is affirmed in certain contexts.
- The intention/foresight distinction's moral relevance in assisted suicide is shown to be variable.
Conclusions:
- Dworkin's framework for understanding abortion and life's value requires further scrutiny.
- Nuance is necessary when applying distinctions like killing vs. letting die and intention vs. foresight to assisted suicide.
- An alternative ethical framework supporting physician-assisted suicide is presented.