Autonomy, sanity and moral theory.

Area of Science:

• Moral Philosophy
• Ethics
• Psychology

Background:

• Autonomy is central to moral theory, serving as a basis for action constraints and moral principles.
• Current understanding often seeks a value-neutral definition of autonomy, focusing on psychological structures.
• This approach may limit autonomy's capacity to fulfill its roles in moral discourse.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically examine the concept of autonomy in moral theory.
• To investigate whether current conceptions of autonomy can adequately serve their foundational and constraining roles.
• To propose and defend a value-laden conception of autonomy.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of autonomy in moral theory.
• Critique of value-neutral definitions of autonomy.
• Development and defense of a value-laden framework for autonomy.

Main Results:

• Value-neutral conceptions of autonomy are insufficient and misaligned with practical intentions.
• A value-laden conception of autonomy is necessary for robust moral theory.
• This value-laden view has significant implications for understanding autonomy's roles.

Conclusions:

• Autonomy's role in moral theory necessitates a value-laden, not value-neutral, definition.
• A value-laden approach better supports both the constraining and foundational aspects of autonomy.
• Rethinking autonomy is crucial for advancing moral philosophy.