Evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity in repeated dyadic games
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Lindsay Browning1, Andrew M Colman
1Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3UD, UK. lindsay.browning@psy.ox.ac.uk
Abstract:
A genetic algorithm incorporating mutation and crossing-over was used to investigate the evolution of social behaviour in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken (Hawk-Dove), Battle of the Sexes, and Leader games. The results show that the strategic structure of an interaction has a crucial determining effect on the type of social behaviour that evolves. In particular, simulations using repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken (Hawk-Dove) games lead to the emergence of genes coding for symmetric reciprocity and the evolution of mutual cooperation, whereas simulations using repeated Battle of the Sexes and Leader games lead to near-fixation of genes coding for asymmetric strategic choices and the evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity. A mechanism is suggested whereby, in games with asymmetric equilibrium points, coordinated alternating reciprocity might evolve without insight or communication between players.
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