The pro-life argument from substantial identity: a defence

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Biology
• Bioethics
• Metaphysics

Background:

• The debate on when human value and rights begin is central to bioethical discussions.
• Existing arguments often rely on acquired characteristics to determine personhood or rights.
• This article addresses objections from prominent philosophers like Dean Stretton, Judith Thomson, and Jeffrey Reiman.

Purpose of the Study:

• To defend the argument that intrinsic value is tied to our essential nature as organisms.
• To refute the claim that value is acquired through developmental stages after conception.
• To explore the philosophical implications of acquired characteristics for personal dignity and rights.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation and conceptual analysis.
• Critique of existing objections to the essentialist view of human value.
• Logical analysis of the implications of developmental criteria for rights.

Main Results:

• Human value is an essential property of physical organisms, present from conception/fertilization.
• The distinction between a basic capacity and its developed form is a difference in degree, not kind.
• Attributing value based on acquired characteristics leads to arbitrary distinctions and undermines equal dignity.

Conclusions:

• The essential nature of an organism, present from conception, is the basis for its value and right to life.
• Developmental stages do not create or confer fundamental value; they represent degrees of an existing capacity.
• The concept of acquired characteristics for rights is philosophically untenable and ethically dangerous, violating principles of equal dignity.