Administrative issues related to infectious disease research in the age of bioterrorism

The recent unprecedented growth in infectious disease research funding and infrastructure has resulted in part from an outgrowth of concern about newly emerging and re-emerging diseases and the progressive development of antibiotic-resistant pathogens. However, the most compelling impetus is the suspected and demonstrated capability and will of unknown individuals, groups, or states to use biological agents and/or toxins as weapons. Although the actual number of known victims and fatalities from bioterrorism in the United States has been miniscule compared with many other daily hazards, biological agents have the potential to cause human mass casualties, severely damage segments of our economy or agricultural infrastructure, poison or compromise our food or water supply, and, perhaps most damaging, disrupt our society physically and psychologically. The significant institutional commitment necessary to participate in infectious disease research is described, with a focus on programs that involve research with pathogens thought to have potential for use by bioterrorists. Administrative considerations are described, and include obtaining necessary research funding to offset high operating costs; complying with "select agent" regulations, security screening of employees; building or renovating a biocontainment facility; finding skilled professional and technical manpower; providing adequate physical security in a threat environment; conducting targeted training; overcoming potential internal and external dissent; developing and/or providing sufficient occupational health and safety programs; achieving and maintaining compliance standards in a fluid regulatory environment; mitigating potentially hazardous working conditions; understanding personal and institutional liability; and reassuring and dealing with a concerned, skeptical, or even hostile public.