Selective play: choosing partners in an uncertain world

Area of Science:

• Game Theory
• Experimental Economics
• Computational Social Science

Background:

• Traditional experimental gaming uses "forced play," where players cannot change partners.
• The "selective play" paradigm allows players to leave and form new relationships.
• Previous research indicated the Out-for-Tat (OFT) strategy excelled in selective play.

Purpose of the Study:

• To explore the theoretical implications of the selective play paradigm in experimental gaming.
• To re-evaluate the effectiveness of the Out-for-Tat (OFT) strategy under new conditions.
• To identify optimal strategies in selective play environments with opportunity costs.

Main Methods:

• A computer tournament simulating the prisoner's dilemma network was conducted.
• The tournament incorporated "opportunity costs" into the selective play environment.
• Strategies were evaluated based on their performance and adaptability.

Main Results:

• The Out-for-Tat (OFT) strategy demonstrated limitations when opportunity costs were introduced.
• OFT prematurely committed to cooperative partners, missing better opportunities.
• A "trustful" strategy with a positive payoff bias for strangers was the top performer.

Conclusions:

• The effectiveness of the OFT strategy is context-dependent and vulnerable to opportunity costs.
• Trust and a positive bias towards new interactions can be advantageous in selective play.
• Future research should consider opportunity costs when designing selective play experiments.