Emotions and cooperation in economic games

Area of Science:

• Behavioral Economics
• Neuroeconomics

Background:

• Cooperation decisions in economic games are complex.
• Understanding the role of pleasure in decision-making is crucial.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate the relationship between pleasure derived from payoffs and cooperative behavior.
• To differentiate between strategic and non-strategic pleasure in economic decision-making.

Main Methods:

• Modified ultimatum and dictator games with fixed offer sets.
• Players reported preferences and imagined pleasure from payoffs.
• Analysis of how pleasure sources (fairness vs. greed) influence choices.

Main Results:

• Individual differences exist in deriving pleasure from fairness versus greed.
• Players' choices are influenced by "strategic pleasure" (expected offers) and "non-strategic pleasure" (accepted payoffs).
• Payoff-driven players made fair offers in the ultimatum game and selfish offers in the dictator game, maximizing strategic and non-strategic pleasure, respectively. Fairness-driven players acted fairly in both games, maximizing non-strategic pleasure.

Conclusions:

• Pleasure derived from payoffs significantly predicts cooperative and non-cooperative behavior in economic games.
• Distinct strategies emerge based on whether players prioritize fairness or financial gain.
• Future neuroimaging studies are warranted to explore the neurological underpinnings of these pleasure-preference links.