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Stem cell research, personhood and sentience
1Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, School of Law, Williamson Building, Oxford Road, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK. Lisa.Bortolotti@manchester.ac.uk
Reproductive Biomedicine Online
|April 12, 2005
Summary
This paper defends stem cell research on early human embryos by arguing they lack sentience and personhood. Therefore, embryos do not warrant direct moral consideration or treatment as persons.
Area of Science:
- Bioethics
- Embryology
- Neuroscience
Background:
- The moral status of early human embryos is a contentious issue in bioethics.
- Current debates often hinge on concepts like sentience and personhood.
- Stem cell research holds significant therapeutic potential but faces ethical hurdles regarding embryo use.
Purpose of the Study:
- To defend the permissibility of stem cell research using early human embryos.
- To critically examine the moral arguments for granting early human embryos personhood.
- To establish a framework for moral consideration based on sentience and personhood.
Main Methods:
- Philosophical argumentation analyzing moral status criteria.
- Critique of common arguments for embryo personhood (potentiality, symbolic value, human dignity).
- Ethical analysis of sentience and personhood requirements.
Main Results:
- Early human embryos are not sentient and thus lack direct moral consideration.
- Embryos do not meet the criteria for personhood.
- Arguments from potentiality, symbolic value, and human dignity are deemed insufficient to warrant treating embryos as persons.
Conclusions:
- Stem cell research on early human embryos is ethically permissible.
- Moral status requires sentience and/or personhood, which early embryos lack.
- The ethical permissibility of embryo research is supported by denying embryos moral consideration as persons.