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Reproductive cloning and arguments from potential.

Justin Oakley1

  • 1Centre for Human Bioethics, Monash University, Australia.

Monash Bioethics Review
|July 13, 2006
PubMed
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Potentiality-based arguments for fetal moral status remain valid despite human reproductive cloning. Adult somatic cells are not potential persons because cloning creates a new individual, not a continuation of the cell.

Area of Science:

  • Bioethics
  • Philosophy of Biology
  • Reproductive Technologies

Background:

  • Bioethicists question potentiality-based arguments for fetal moral status due to human reproductive cloning.
  • The core issue is whether adult somatic cells, if reprogrammed, can be considered potential persons.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To defend potentiality-based arguments for fetal moral status against objections raised by reproductive cloning.
  • To analyze the concept of numerical identity and potentiality in the context of cloning.

Main Methods:

  • Philosophical argumentation
  • Analysis of numerical identity and potentiality
  • Critique of reductio ad absurdum arguments in bioethics

Main Results:

Keywords:
Analytical ApproachGenetics and ReproductionPhilosophical Approach

Related Experiment Videos

  • Human reproductive cloning involves cell reprogramming that results in a new individual.
  • Adult somatic cells, therefore, cannot be considered potential persons in the context of cloning.
  • Potentiality-based arguments for fetal moral status are not undermined by cloning.

Conclusions:

  • Potentiality-based arguments for fetal moral status are philosophically defensible.
  • The process of reproductive cloning generates a distinct entity, not a potential continuation of the somatic cell.
  • Bioethical discussions on fetal status should consider the nature of identity and potentiality in biological processes.