Personhood and neuroscience: naturalizing or nihilating?

Area of Science:

• Neuroscience
• Cognitive Science
• Ethics

Background:

• The concept of personhood is central to ethical discourse.
• Existing definitions in psychological and neurological terms lack specificity and non-arbitrariness.
• The elusiveness of a concrete definition suggests a different conceptual origin.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate current psychological and neurological definitions of personhood.
• To propose an alternative framework for understanding the origin of the concept of personhood.
• To explore the implications of this new framework for ethics and morality.

Main Methods:

• Literature review of psychological and neurological approaches to personhood.
• Theoretical analysis of the concept of personhood as a cognitive construct.
• Examination of neuroscientific evidence for a dedicated 'person network' in the brain.

Main Results:

• Psychological and neurological definitions of personhood are found to be arbitrary and lack specificity.
• The concept of personhood is proposed to arise from an innate, evolved brain system.
• This system automatically projects personhood onto stimuli like human faces, bodies, or behaviors.

Conclusions:

• Personhood does not represent a distinct category of objects but is a cognitive projection.
• An autonomous 'person network' in the brain underpins this projection.
• Understanding this network has significant implications for ethical theory and everyday moral judgments.