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Social eavesdropping: a game-theoretic analysis.

Mike Mesterton-Gibbons1, Tom N Sherratt

  • 1Department of Mathematics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida 32306-4510, USA. mesterto@math.fsu.edu

Bulletin of Mathematical Biology
|March 21, 2007
PubMed
Summary
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This study introduces a continuous Hawk-Dove model where fighting strength determines winners. Eavesdropping on contests raises aggression thresholds, reducing fights among weaker individuals by highlighting the costs of challenging stronger opponents.

Area of Science:

  • Evolutionary Game Theory
  • Animal Behavior
  • Behavioral Ecology

Background:

  • The classic Hawk-Dove model assumes discrete fighting strengths and random outcomes.
  • Previous models did not account for continuous variation in fighting ability or social eavesdropping.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To extend the Hawk-Dove model to incorporate continuous fighting strengths and analyze the impact of social eavesdropping.
  • To determine evolutionary stable strategies for aggression in continuous conflict scenarios.

Main Methods:

  • Developed a continuous Hawk-Dove game model with variable fighting strengths.
  • Analyzed evolutionary stable strength thresholds under different cost structures.
  • Incorporated social eavesdropping within three-individual networks.

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Main Results:

  • In the continuous model, the stronger individual always wins, with costs increasing for evenly matched fights.
  • Aggression thresholds are influenced by the variance in fighting strength and cost sensitivity to asymmetry.
  • Social eavesdropping increases aggression thresholds, reducing aggressive encounters for weaker individuals.

Conclusions:

  • Continuous variation in fighting strength fundamentally alters conflict dynamics compared to discrete models.
  • Social eavesdropping can decrease aggression by making animals more risk-averse to challenging perceived winners.
  • Information about fighting ability, even if unobserved, influences behavioral strategies in animal conflicts.