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Related Experiment Videos

Free will, the self, and the brain.

Gilberto Gomes1

  • 1ggomes@uenf.br

Behavioral Sciences & the Law
|March 30, 2007
PubMed
Summary
This summary is machine-generated.

This study explores the free will problem, favoring a compatibilist view where the "I" is brain activity. True freedom requires not just randomness but also the absence of sufficient causal determination for choices.

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Area of Science:

  • Philosophy of Mind
  • Neuroscience
  • Physics

Background:

  • The free will problem is a long-standing philosophical debate.
  • Common solutions include no-freedom theory, libertarianism, and compatibilism.
  • Strict determinism is often assumed, but modern physics introduces randomness.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To define the free will problem and analyze existing solutions.
  • To propose a refined compatibilist view of free will.
  • To explore the implications of free will for responsibility.

Main Methods:

  • Philosophical analysis of free will concepts.
  • Integration of insights from modern physics.
  • Examination of the role of the 'I' (self) in decision-making.

Related Experiment Videos

  • Materialist perspective on the 'I' as brain activity.

    • Main Results:

    • Compatibilism is favored, defining freedom as more than randomness.
    • The 'I' is conceptualized as brain activity, crucial to the free will debate.
    • Freedom requires absence of external/internal compulsion and causal sufficiency of influences.
    • A novel compatibilist model suggests complete causal determination includes unconscious brain events.

    Conclusions:

    • The experience of agency is fallible, not illusory.
    • The readiness potential preceding action is compatible with this view.
    • Understanding the nature of the 'I' is key to resolving the free will problem.
    • Different views on freedom have significant consequences for moral responsibility.