Casting a wider net for countermeasure R&D funding decisions

Area of Science:

• Public Health
• Infectious Disease Epidemiology
• Biodefense Risk Assessment

Background:

• Current risk assessments for bioweapons attacks are conducted separately from those for endemic infectious diseases.
• This separation may lead to funding decisions influenced by exaggerated fears of bioweapons and political factors.
• Existing priorities may not accurately reflect the actual public health risks posed by different threats.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose and evaluate a "combined risk assessment" model for allocating resources.
• To compare the risks of bioweapons attacks, influenza pandemics, and endemic infectious diseases.
• To advocate for a revised funding strategy for research and countermeasure development.

Main Methods:

• A simplified combined risk assessment framework was developed.
• The assessment primarily considered mortality data to highlight skewed priorities.
• Bioweapons threats were analyzed alongside natural pandemics and endemic diseases.

Main Results:

• The combined risk assessment indicates a need for increased funding for endemic infectious diseases.
• Biodefense against agents like anthrax should be assigned a lower priority in the risk hierarchy.
• Current resource allocation may be disproportionately focused on bioweapons threats.

Conclusions:

• A unified risk assessment approach is crucial for effective public health resource allocation.
• Prioritizing endemic infectious diseases is supported by a mortality-focused risk analysis.
• Further debate is needed on the policy and quantitative rationale behind current bioweapons threat rankings.