Possibilities of consensus: toward democratic moral discourse

Area of Science:

• Biomedical Ethics
• Applied Ethics
• Moral Philosophy

Background:

• Consensus is crucial in biomedical and applied ethics, particularly for theorists rejecting ethical realism.
• It influences ethical theories framing ethics as discourse and is vital in bureaucratic medical decision-making.
• Existing models like pluralistic and overlapping consensus are examined.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critique existing models of consensus in ethical discourse.
• To propose an alternative conception of consensus rooted in democratic moral agency.
• To define the conditions under which consensus holds moral authority.

Main Methods:

• Critical analysis of pluralistic and overlapping consensus models.
• Development of a normative conception of democratic moral agency.
• Examination of the dialogic aspects of ethical consensus.

Main Results:

• Pluralistic and overlapping consensus models are found inadequate.
• Consensus is redefined as intrinsically linked to dialogic democratic moral agency.
• The preconditions for dialogic practice determine consensus's justificatory role.

Conclusions:

• Mere agreement does not constitute moral consensus without proper dialogic preconditions.
• True ethical consensus requires a foundation in democratic moral agency and discourse.
• The authority of consensus in ethics is contingent upon the fulfillment of specific dialogic criteria.