Consciousness related neural events viewed as brain state space transitions

This theoretical and speculative essay addresses a categorical distinction between neural events of sensory-motor cognition and those presumably associated with consciousness. It proposes to view this distinction in the framework of the branch of Statistical Physics currently referred to as Modern Critical Theory (Stanley, Introduction to phase transitions and critical phenomena, 1987; Marro and Dickman, Nonequilibrium phase transitions in lattice, 1999). Based on established landmarks of brain dynamics, network configurations and their role for conveying oscillatory activity of certain frequencies bands, the question is examined: what kind of state space transitions can systems with these properties undergo, and could the relation between neural processes of sensory-motor cognition and those of events in consciousness be of the same category as is characterized by state transitions in non-equilibrium physical systems? Approaches for empirical validation of this view by suitably designed brain imaging studies, and for computational simulations of the proposed principle are discussed.